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COMPARING REGI ME CONTINUIT Y 
AND CHANGE: 
INDONESIA, THAI LAND, AND MALAYSIA 
William Case 
A vast literature has accumulated about democratic preconditions, transitions, 
and consolidation in developing countries, highlighting the centrality of these 
themes in comparative politics today. Further, much of this discussion has 
been collated among the geographic areas through which democracy's 'third 
wave' (Huntington 1990) has recently passed, enabling specialists to control 
for important contextual variables. In explaining regime openings in the 
relatively uniform settings of South America, southern Europe, eastern Eu­
rope, and East Asia, for example, area specialists have been able to analyti­
cally set aside such disparate, though significant, features and legacies as 
bureaucratic authoritarianism, latifundist agriculture, Soviet antecedents, new 
NIC statuses, Catholicism, Confucianism, and varying degrees of ethnic or 
cultural complexity. 1bis has permitted, in short, much comparative work, the 
testing of relatively uncluttered causal statements across a number of cases. 
Then, after sketching out bold regional generalizations, specialists have been 
able to factor in fine country uniquenesses, specifying with even greater 
exactness the relationships between democratic pressures and outcomes. 
Among students of Southeast Asian politics, however, the utility of com­
parative methods and democratic perspectives has been less clear. It is a 
commonplace that Southeast Asia, historically at the crossroads of diverse 
political, economic, and social currents, limits analysis to country-specific 
studies and narrow, ad hoe explanations. Moreover, in even those few countries 
where democratization has recently taken place (i.e., Thailand and the Philip­
pines), it remains unconsolidated, while other countries in the region have 
avoided significant opening altogether. Throughout much of Southeast Asia, 
then, observers have detected at most a slight liberalization, brought on by mild 
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increases in the structural autonomy of top conglomerates, the lobbying capac­
ity of business associations, and the fluctuating aspirations of the new middle 
class. These categories, however, seem to promise no further progress toward 
democracy, and they may, in the short tenn, even weaken it. After pressing 
successfully for their own political inclusion, their next impulse has been to shut 
the door tightly behind themselves. 
Nonetheless, this paper searches for ground on which to make very general 
sense of politics in Southeast Asia, drawing on the concepts and insights of the 
recent democratization literature. To make this more manageable, inquiry 
focuses on Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. Of course, even after limiting 
study to these countries, one still finds their incongruities daunting, noting in 
particular that while all fall short of stable democratic regimes, they do so in very 
different ways. But if we are guided by a suitable framework and set of research 
questions, we discover also that these cases have more in common than 
cartographic nearness. First, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia, like all countries, 
feature national leaders and elites - an entryway, I will argue, for at least 
broad-stroke analysis. Secondly, because political life in these settings remains 
heavily 'state-dominated' (Hewison, Rodan and Robison 1993). The nature of 
elite statuses and power shows some important resemblances across the board. 
1birdly, these countries are all ranked at upper-lower or lower-middle income 
levels, yet they are the region's largest, high-growth economic performers. One 
expects to find at least some parallels, then, in the rapid transformations of their 
social structures and attitudes. Finally, if we cannot yet speak about democratic 
stability in these countries, we can attempt at least to classify and account for the 
regime forms that they do display, giving special attention to the traits that may 
hold up, roll back, or hasten regime opening. In taking this approach, we can 
begin to assess-on a rough, though common, basis-the nature of the regimes 
that result and the likelihood of change. 
Leaders, elites, societal audiences, and regimes 
In this section, my puipose is to help articulate an analytical framework, one 
which when applied across regimes in Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia will 
maintain its parsimony and cohesiveness. In doing this, I draw on the neo-elite 
paradigm developed by Field, Higley, and Burton, treating relations between 
national leaders and state elites, and between these configurations and their 
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societal audiences, as distinct from, and causally prior to, the fonns regimes 
take. Higley and Burton define regimes as 'basic patterns in the organization, 
exercise, and transfer of government [state] decision-making power' (Higley 
and Burton 1989:78) . .  Hence, a regime does not involve state position holders 
or institutional arenas so much as procedures, the ways in which state posi­
tions are filled and institutions are operated. Further, a regime can be roughly 
categorized as stable or unstable, depending on the extent to which state 
power may be subject to 'irregular seizures, attempted seizures, or widely 
expected seizures by force' (ibid.:20). Such questions about stability are often 
dismissed as uninteresting, surviving from an earlier era of enquiry about the 
functions and persistence of political systems. But as we will see, it remains 
valueless to analyze regimes as authoritarian, democratic, or some permuta­
tion of these forms without first investigating the likelihood of their lasting. 
Afterdetennining a regime's underlying stability, one proceeds reasonably 
to assess its authoritarian or democratic content. Following on from Huntington 
(1990:7), regimes can be thought of as democratic to the extent that state 
position holding and policy making are shaped· by liberal participation and 
electoral contestation - the right of societal audiences freely to organize 
opposition parties and voluntary associations, and then to support them through 
meaningful voting, free speech, and litigation. Tirls is to understand democracy, 
then - as all regimes must be understood - in terms of political procedures. 
To push further and speak of 'economic' or 'social' democracy is to confuse 
proeedures with substantive preconditions or outcomes, thereby sacrificing 
analytical power. As Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990) make clear, socio­
economic equality may help precipitate democracy (as land refonn has in 
Taiwan, perhaps, and welfare programmes have in South Korea), and it may 
flow later from democracy as policy outputs. Conversely, deep inequalities may 
either hinder democracy's consolidation or hasten its collapse (as in Brazil in 
1964). In no case, however, is it fruitful to consider these variables as one and 
the same (Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992: 2). 
One thus conceptualizes four basic regimes, that is, stable and unstable 
forms of democracy and authoritarianism. But because some regimes depart 
from ideal types, one can also envision some intennediate forms, labelling them 
-withreluctance- as  'semi-stability' and 'semi-democracy' (Diamond, Linz 
and Lipset 1990:7-9)1• One does this reluctantly because while such categories 
must in some way be named, this particular way is unsatisfactory on two counts. 
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First, many scholars contend that objectivity is compromised by the strong 
nonnative preference for stability and democracy that these tenns imply. One 
can only respond by admitting a personal preference for stability, at least in its 
democratic fonn, but denying that this is permitted to colour analysis. Secondly 
(and more seriously), semi-stability and semi-democracy cannot be adequately 
understood as mere mid-points on continuums, destined to tip over into one ideal 
type or another. Though many authors warn that 'betwixt-and-between cases' 
or political 'half-way houses' are shot through with frailties (Huntington 
1990:12; Di Palma 1990:157), Crouch des cri bes the resilience of 
semi-democracy in Malaysia, the contrary pressures that in pushing the state 
both ways at once leave its regime form firmly in place (Crouch 1993:133-137). 
As such, Malaysia may be better plotted somewhat off the four-cell table of 
regime types �an somewhere near its centre, displaying a complexity that 
cannot fully be captured by· an authoritarian/democratic dichotomy or the 
nether-world precariousness that semi-democracy suggests.2 
But whatever the fonns that regimes might take, how can we account for 
these outcomes and the possibilities of change? Huntington, in The Third Wave 
(1990), highlights the role of elites in effecting transitions,3 but then seems to 
credit the regimes that result with lives of.their own. He portrays authoritarian 
regimes as intrinsically susceptible to change: whether the state that operates 
them promotes economic growth or fails to, it generates strong societal pressures 
for openness (ibid. :35). Democratic regimes, on the other hand, are said to be 
more naturally stable, offering avenues for peaceful changes of government 
rather than irregular seizures of state power (ibid.: 263). Similarly, in itemizing 
ten causes of democratic transition in Democracy and Developing Countries, 
Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990:25-29) list political leadership, though attach 
no special importance to it, giving more stress to the roles of two-party systems, 
parliamentary legislatures, and judiciaries. This is in keeping with the accent on 
institutions in Linz's earlier work, 'the broad thrust of which ... was that the 
failure of institutions exacerbated political conflict and failed to prevent the 
breakdown of democratic regimes in Europe in the interwar years and in Latin 
America in the 1960s and 1970s' (Hagopian 1993:479-80; Hagopian refers to 
Linz 1978). But in giving regime procedures and institutional arenas such 
innately determinative properties, we are denied the tools necessary for more 
fully explaining them. Democratic regimes fall as regularly as authoritarian 
ones do, and parliamentary institutions seem as helpless to prevent this as 
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presidential systems are. Hence, we need to look outside regime forms in order 
to account for them. 
One way to do this is to recognize the pivotal role of national leaders and 
state elites. No doubt regime procedures and institutional arenas, once in place, 
feed back on and guide the elite interaction that precedes the causality flows 
more heavily from elites to regimes, driving transitions or underpinning 
continuity. Put another way, a regime form is only as sound as the elite-level 
commitments on which it rests. Field and Higley define elites as 'persons who 
are able, by virtue of their strategic positions in powerful organizations, to affect 
national political outcomes regularly and substantially' (Field and Higley 
1985:8). In the 'statist' setting of Southeast Asia, most such organizations are 
still state-based, comprising executive cabinets and 'councils' ,  powerful bu­
reaucratic apparatuses, and security forces. Moreover, a national leader - a 
president, prime minister, monarch, eminence grise, or 'strong man' - may 
sometimes emerge who helps shape relations between state elites, either 
enforcing or disrupting their patterns of behaviour. Among contemporary 
leaders in Southeast Asia, one thinks of Suharto, Mahathir, Lee Kuan Yew, and 
Ne Win. On the other hand, a leader's actions may prompt state elites collec­
tively to assist or restrain him or her. Some good examples of thelatter outcome 
are President Marcos 's removal in 1986 and, in India, Prime Minister Gandhi's 
defeat by hastily unified Janata leaders in . 1977. But whatever configurations 
emerge between leaders and elites, they have strong consequences for regime 
forms. 
Thus, after discovering the organizational bases of elite statuses, one next 
assesses the ways in which elites interact, noting in particular the intensity with 
which they carry out their competitions. In most Southeast Asian settings, elites 
compete ruthlessly, creating conditions in which it is foolhardy for any single 
faction to act with restraint. Such configurations may be punctuated overtly by 
elite-level conflicts and societal violence (as occurred in 'Old Order' Indone­
sia), or they may give rise to tense deadlocks that persist quietly for long periods 
(which may describe 'New Order' Indonesia). In both instances, however, elite 
relations are marred by distrust, producing regimes that are fundamentally 
unstable. 
In other, rarer, cases elites act with what different authors have described 
as 'consensual unity' (Higley and Burton 1 989:18-19; Burton, Gunther and 
Higley 1992: 1 1),elite 'solidarity' (Putnam 1976:121-122),or, inpural societies, 
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elite 'coalescence' (Lijphart 1977), or 'conciliatory attitudes and regulatory 
behaviour' (Nordlinger 1977:54). In organizing their relations in these ways, 
elites construct and abide by 'rules of the game' which, while in many ways 
unique to particular settings, seem universally to involve two broad kinds of 
restraint. First, elites eschew strategies that undercut directly the statuses of 
other elites, thereby sparing one another's organizational. resources and core 
interests. Put siinply, elites who are unified may compete vigorously, but they 
do not do so at all costs. Secondly, when these elites move outside their 
configurations to attract mass support, they undennobilize the most serious 
grievances of their societal. followings. 4 In these circumstances, elites may issue 
ethnic, class-based, or regionalist appeals, but they stop short of inciting serious 
unrest Taken together, these kinds of restraint mean that state elites who are 
unified do not mount coups and takeovers against one another, and, by refusing 
to inflame mass discontents, they remain able also to contain societal. challenges. 
This absence of coups and uprisings offers the practical. hallmark of regiine 
stability, a record that among the cases covered in this paper is evident only in 
Malaysia 
By investigating state elites on another dimension - in tenns of their 
attitudes toward, and relations with, societal. audiences - we can assess the 
authoritarian or delllocratic content of their regimes, as well as the likelihood of 
change from one fonn to the other. In Southeast Asia, elites possessing strong 
state resources have faced fragmented societies, enabling them usually to adopt 
dismissive attitudes and top-down controls. 1bis has involved blunt exclusion, 
highly skewed patrimonial.ism, or tight corporatist mechanisms that have at 
most offered uneven responsiveness. Such attitudes and relations have typically 
produced authoritarian regimes. More rarely, however, elites have conceded the 
right of societal audiences to organize autonomously. Where this has resulted 
in bottom-up access to state policy making and recruitment, we can probably 
classify the regiine as semi-democratic or democratic. 
However, in assessing the ways in which elite-mass relations affect a regime 
form, it is iinportant also to note that elites have not simply accepted mass 
attitudes as given. Whether elites have maintained relations with societal. 
audiences characterized by control or autonomy, and whether they have 
operated regimes that have been authoritarian or democratic, they have often 
sought actively to convince these audiences about the rightfulness of their 
arrangements. In short,just as elites sometimes agree over game rules, they may 
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strive to embrace societal audiences in validating ideologies or 'mentalities' 
(Linz 1975 :264 ). Thus, in any account of the politics that emerge between state 
and society, one must observe the ways in which state elites claim legitimacy, 
and the ways in which societal audiences respond. 
In turning to discuss changes from authoritarianism to democracy, we 
begin with a question. If it is true that elites in Southeast Asia have possessed 
enough state power and ideological creativity that they have not had to 
democratize or even to maintain such democratic procedures as colonial 
experience may have left them, under what circumstances would they choose to 
do so? Let us consider some different motivations. As we have seen, disunified 
state elites, in seeking ruthlessly to bolster their standings or weaken those of 
their rivals, appeal frequently to the ethnic loyalties, class positions, or strong 
regional allegiances of societal audiences. In this same spirit, some elite factions 
may denounce their rivals as undemocratic, then energize new support for 
themselves through specious pledges to democratize politics. In Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule, it is perhaps O'Donnell and Schmitter's primary thesis that 
breakups of ruling coalitions pave the way to democracy (1986:15-36). But 
while deftly charting the pathways to such breakups, they are less able to 
elaborate the causes, or, indeed, the consequences for democracy if elite 
disunity persists. The assumptions of the neo-elite paradigm lead us to expect 
that any democratic procedures growing out of elite rivalries must eventually be 
rescinded by disgruntled elite factions, or perhaps even by the faction that had 
initially advocated them once its drive for ascendancy is complete. In these 
cases, the rhetoric of democracy is but one more stratagem in the kit of warring 
elites. Equally, when elite factions battle to a standstill, creating rare and fragile 
apertures through which societal audiences can nudge regimes open further, 
elites may temper their conflicts just enough that they are able again to close 
them. This pattern corresponds in many ways to Huntington's (1990:276) 
notion of regime 'replacement', and of the several modes of democratization 
that he considers, he rightly regards this one as least lik�ly to consolidate. As 
examples, consider Thailand's brief democracy during 1973-76, and perhaps its 
redemocratization in 1992. 
In contrast, when state elites who are unified choose to democratize, they 
are not motivated by desires to weaken one another's statuses. Rather, they seek 
to retain -even strengthen -their unity, calculating that in some contexts 
democracy imposes fewer costs on their statuses and relations than maintaining 
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steep authoritarian vigilance. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992:43) 
observe that 'democracy may soften, but it certainly does not eliminate the 
differences of power, wealth, and status in class-divided societies'. 5 As such, 
elites can insulate their core interests by making some democratic concessions 
to societal audiences. More specifically, unified state elites who democratize 
consent to electoral challenges, but not to the loss of their incumbency advantages 
or the resources with which to contest office again if they are beaten. In this same 
way, the bourgeoisie consents to fiscal and regulatory controls, but not to the 
nationalization of its capital. 6 But though democracy may buffer elite statuses, 
Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (ibid. :42) contend that it delivers real 
gains to societal audiences, prompting 'redistributive state action' and generally 
elevating human dignity. A democratic regime, in short, has something for 
everyone. Further, in delineating some conciliatory pathways to democracy, 
Huntington (1990:276) describes 'transformations' carried out from above, and 
'transplacements' negotiated between state and society. He notes also that these 
are the routes that most favour consolidation. To date, there have been no 
examples of transformations or transplacement in Southeast Asia. 
But in scouring for factors that may adumbrate such transitions in Indonesia, 
broaden Malaysia's semi-democracy, or consolidate full democracy in Thailand, 
analysts have focused most attention on societal audiences. In terms of class 
structure, they have scrutinized the bourgeoisie (Robison 1985; Robison and 
Goodman 1992:321-27), the middle class (Tanter and Young 1990; Kahn and 
Loh 1992) and the working class (Lane 1991) though have learned that 
meaningful pressures for democracy have emanated from these sources only in 
Thailand, and perhaps fleetingly in Malaysia. Taking another tack, analysts 
have conceptualized civil societies enlivened by rapid economic growth, 
bristling with new business associations and activist NGOs (Anek 1992; 
Macintyre 1990). But as Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992:141) 
remind us, while a 'denser civil society is generally favourable to democracy, 
in some cases it can act as a conduit for authoritarian ideas'. 7 This latter con­
tingency has been strongly evident in Indone�a and, to a lesser extent, in 
Malaysia whe� state elites have manipulated much associational life. Social 
structures are said to favour democracy in still another way, however: the 
presence of ethnic, cultural, or religious pluralism - and further, the rapid 
reinvention of these identities - outrunning state capacity to contain them 
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(Huntington 1984:102-105). But if, as Crouch (1993:152) contends, 'commu­
nalism' has prevented in Malaysia the full closure of semi-democracy, it seems 
at the same time to have discouraged any additional opening. Indeed, the full 
. venting of ethnic passions appears to jeopardize the democracy that permits it 
more than it places a check an authoritarian responses. On this score, it may be 
observed that while state elites in Indonesia face a far more differentiated 
society than Malaysia's, they have had rarely to relax their authoritarian 
controls. In sum, class structures, civil society, and social structures may cut in 
a variety of ways. To see which way, one must investigate elites, in particular 
the attitudes they hold and the relations they forge with societal audiences. 
To summarize, I have presented in this section a loose though 'complex' 
framework, one which asserts the primacy of inter-elite relations for the stability 
of regimes, yet recognizes the significance of elite-mass relations for any regime 
opening. More specifically, we can conceptualize inter-elite relations as unified 
or disunified, and elite-mass relations as controlled or autonomous. These 
attitudes and relations combine to produce four 'ideal' regime types: stable and 
unstable fonns of authoritarianism and democracy. Between these categories, 
one can also describe some hybrid postures, though they may display some 
outlying'features rather than residing simply on continuums. 
In applying this framework, I explore three regime outcomes in contempo­
rary Southeast Asia. My intention is to give equal weight to these cases, rather 
than running with a single story-line against which to bounce the others. Briefly, 
I attribute the authoritarian regime in Indonesia-and its appearance of stability 
- to astute personalist leadership, muted elite rivalries, and control over 
societal audiences. In sharp contrast, Thailand's unstable democracy emerges 
from uneven national leadership, perermial elite disunity, and episodically 
strong and autonomous societal pressures. And Malaysia's semi-democratic 
regime -in some ways bordered by the outcomes in Indonesia and Thailand 
-is explained by skilful national leadership, sustained elite unity, and fluctuating 
levels of societal tensions and claims. The next section of this paper, then, 
assesses relations between leaders and elites in these countries and the stability 
of the regimes that result. The third section considers the ways in which state 
·elites· control or empower societal audiences, thus unfolding in authoritarian or 
democratic politics. And the last section briefly assesses some prospects for the 
transition to, or the consolidation of, political democracy . 
• 
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Elite relations and regime stability 
As Southeast Asia continues to grow economically, scholars busily track the 
movement of state elites into markets (see, for example, Mc Vey 1992). A new 
generation of elites appears even to be abandoning the state in order to ground 
itself more squarely in the world of big business. The children of Indonesia's 
President Suharto, holding no bureaucratic posts yet heading vast conglom­
erates, are often cited as examples of this. But the centrality of the state in 
Southeast Asia - as the organizational basis of elite statuses and as an 
explanatory variable - persists. As Migdal (1988: 16) makes clear, 
even when the state is in the process of shedding whole bureaus and 
rule-making functions - 'in deregulating society' - no one can 
doubt that when markets now take over these functions the state still 
authorizes the new arrangement. And, if there are those who do not 
play by the market rules, the state will use its authority to enforce 
contracts made in the marketplace. 
To the extent that this is true in Indonesia, Suharto' s children have only been 
able to leap into business because Suharto remains president, insulating their 
dealings and warding off criticisms. In short, while one explains regime stability 
in terms of elite attitudes and relations, elite statuses must still be understood 
primarily in terms of the state. Let us briefly identify in Indonesia, Thailand, and 
Malaysia which state organizations are most salient, then examine the unity or 
disunity between their elites. 
Indonesia 
Politics in Indonesia, even more than in most other Southeast Asian countries, 
has been confined to the state-elite level. Robison (1992:45) writes that 'the 
fundamentally unique feature of Indonesia's New Order is that the source of 
political power and political leadership lies within the state apparatus itself, 
and that political power and bureaucratic authority are appropriated and 
integrated by the officials of the state'. He notes also, however, that this was 
not always the case, characterizing the Old Order under Sukarno as distinctly 
more 'populist'. To understand how this change occurred, let us quickly trace 
out some key shifts in elite statuses and relations. 
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During the 1950s, Indonesia was beset by a series of Muslim and ethnic 
rebellions in its outer islands. This prompted President Sukarno, the national 
leader, to react with military force, quelling these rebellions and greatly 
truncating the party system thathad given expression to them. In tum, state elites 
in the military, their claim on state power already strengthened by their role in 
the' revolution' against Dutch colonialism during 1945-49, and their expropriation 
of Dutch enterprises in 1957, extended their authority over state organizations 
through 'a doctrine of the "middle way" (neither fully military nor fully civilian 
government)' (Liddle 1991 :446). Sukarno tried to push the military back, 
forging new links to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), one of the few 
parties still permitted to mobilize the masses. But while seeking corporatist 
balance, Sukarno bogged down instead in an elite-level deadlock, then finally 
a show-down during 1965-66 which he was helpless to mediate. It remains 
unclear which side triggered the conflict, but it enabled the military to crush the 
PKI leadership and slaughter its mass following. Moreover, in doing this, it 
re-energized Muslim groups in rural areas through which to carry out the 
bloodletting (Hefner 1991:208), but then turned on them also, leaving the 
military finally ascendant Liddle concludes that the lesson military elites 
'learned from these experiences was the importance of establishing and 
maintaining, first, unity among themselves and, second, tight control over 
others ... most especially Muslims, regionalists, and Communists' (Liddle 
1991:447). Thus, while steadily stripping Sukarno of his power, the military 
tightened its hold over the state bureaucracy. It began also to finance its activities 
by collaborating with Chinese capitalists and disseminating state contracts 
(Crouch 1988:284-285), and it organized societal support through its political 
vehicle, the GOLKAR (Golongan Karya, 'Functional Groups'). 
But analysts differ about how well military elites have maintained their 
unity over time .. Liddle (1991:451) claims that 'discontented members of the 
core elite' have voiced remarkably few grievances, while Vatikiotis (1993: 61), 
in an informed journalistic account, sketches a mosaic of deep factional and 
generational cleavages. Between these poles, Robison distinguishes elites in the 
command structure of the ABRI (Anned Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) 
and Defense Ministry on the one hand, from retired officers who have taken 
high-level posts in the cabinet, bureaucracy, and state secretariat (Sekneg) en the 
other. The strains between the leaders of these organizations have been evident 
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since 1974 when General Sumitro, directing Kopkamtib, the military security 
apparatus, lost a power struggle to General Moertopo, the head of the 
executive-based OPSUS (Special Operations Office). This involved the mobi­
lization of ' outsider' student groups and culminated in the Malari riots in Jakarta 
-key indicators of elite disunity- and it brought about ' a major shift of power 
and influence to the Presidential Palace' (Robison 1992:50). 
Indeed, to the degree that divisions have existed in the military, it has sprung 
from uncertainty over how to respond to General Suharto 's rise from its ranks 
to become president in 1968. Since assuming the presidency, Suharto has 
steadily strengthened it, removing it from the military and clinging to it 
intenninably. In particular, analysts note his accumulation of patronage resources, 
his use of Sekneg to dispense state contracts, his off-budget charitable founda­
tions (yayasans), and his vast family wealth. Vatikiotis (1993:58) writes that 
'among Suharto' s key talents has been his ability to defuse threats to his rule and 
then mostly co-opt those responsible'. Military elites, resentful over their 
slippage in status and narrowing access to state enterprises and commercial 
opportunities have sometimes let student groups mobilize to vent grievances­
most recently to oppose Suharto's re-election bid in 1992. They have also 
plotted the downfall of state elites closely associated with Suharto, first 
opposing Sudhanno 's ascension as state secretary, for example, then forcing 
him out as vice president Suharto has responded in ways that, while skilful, have 
been unguided by unity over game rules: appointing non-Muslims or 
non-Javanese as top military commanders, ordering surprise promotions and 
transfers, rerouting patronage, and crisscrossing the military with competing 
intelligence agencies. But because Suharto has done this astutely, using his 
paramountcy as national leader to exploit the splits in the military that his very 
paramountcy has caused, he has prevented the military from moving concert­
edly against him. 8 Further, when the military recently increased its pressure by 
unleashing student activists, Suharto responded in equal measure, mobilizing 
Islamic sentiments through his sponsorship of the Association of Indonesian 
Muslim Intellectuals (IC:MI). 
In sum, in this dynamic between the national leader and state elites, Suharto 
has combined patrimonialistinclusion with artful division. The military has thus 
benefitted enough that it has shielded the state from societal challenges; it has 
been divided enough that it has been unable to mount its own challenge against 
the national leader in an effort to regain its earlier standing. Thus, paradoxically, 
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the disunity of Indonesia's elite configuration has been fashioned into an 
appearance of regime stability. But President Suharto is now 70 years old, and 
his departure from power may mark the collapse of the tenuous balancing 
mechanisms upon which Indonesia's regime has rested. In this situation, 
disunity between elites may at last come to light 
Thailand 
In Thailand elite statuses have also centred heavily on state organizations. 
Indeed, that debate persists over Riggs's description of the country during the 
1960s as a 'bureaucratic polity' intimates the extent to which the term still has 
some relevance. 9 The paramountcy of bureaucratic and military elites did not, 
however, emerge from any revolt against a colonial power-Thailand being 
the only territory in Southeast Asia not formally to have been colonized. 
Rather, after King Chulalongkorn had undertaken administrative reforms in 
the late nineteenth century, bureaucratic and military elites who had grown 
out of those refonns overthrew the monarchy in 1931. Further, this new 
coalition of state elites kept power for itself, rather than sharing it with 
party-based governments and societal electorates. Seeking to justify this, Thai 
military elites have drawn upon a legacy similar to that of the Indonesian 
military: while the ABRI alludes regularly to its role in driving out colonial­
ism, the military in Thailand can claim to have prevented colonialism from 
ever arriving. They have also resembled Indonesian military elites in another 
way, forming a 'partnership' with local Chinese capitalists that dates back to 
the Phibun governments of the 1940s and 1950s (Chai-Anan 1986:243). In 
these ways, elite statuses in Thailand have primarily involved military and 
- bureaucratic organizations or, more precisely, the strategic areas of overlap 
between them. 
Chai-Anan (1989:320) records also, however, that historically, 'although 
the new military-bureaucratic elites formed the only organized political group 
in society, they were not united', carrying out their corn petitions and ratifying 
their power relations through nearly twenty coups, attempted coups, and 
counter-coups between the revolution of 1932 and 1993. Indeed, only during the 
1960s was the national leader, Field Marshal Sari.t, able to impose a set of elite 
relations that dampened instability. Further, though Sari.t died in 1963, his 
revival of many monarchal powers enabled the king, Bhumibol Adulyadej, to 
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take up a new mediating role. This was also a period, however, during which the 
basis for rapid economic growth and social change was laid, setting the stage for 
new struggles over business assets among military elites, and creating new 
societal expectations that were spearheaded by student groups. In this context, 
a brief interlude of democracy surfaced between elite factions in 1973, though 
it was capped by an unusually brutal coup three years later. But while military 
elites were then able over the next decade and a half to block new societal 
upsurges, they persisted in their pattern of disunity. 
In tracing some of the factional lines that hardened after 1976, Chai-Anan 
describes a milieu of societal 'polarization' and 'fragmentation' between army 
generals (ibid. :316). Specifically, a faction of 'Young Turks', drawn from Class 
7 at the Chulachomklao Military Academy, withdrew its support from General 
Kriangsak as prime minister in 1980 in order to help General Prem Tinsulanond 
to power. The Young Turks then attempted a coup against Prem, but failed to 
win tacit consent from the king (Keyes 1987: 104). To ward off additional coups, 
Prem sought support from the army commander, General Chaovalit 
Yongchaiyuth. During the 1970s Chaovalit had been linked to the 'Democratic 
Soldiers ... a group of self-styled intellectual officers' (Hewison 1993: 165). But 
when launching his own career as a politician during the 1980s, Chaovalittumed 
to the 'Class 5 Conservatives' under General Suchinda Kraprayoon, and he 
permitted them to fill top positions in the the military and police. The Class 5 
Conservatives were thus well placed to overthrow Prem's elected successor, 
Chatichai Choonhavan, in 1991, after he had appointed a member of the Young 
Turks to his government 
The Qass 5 Conservatives were no more able, however, to forge elite unity. 
By repudiating the results of the elections that they held in 1992, and in harshly 
suppressing the mass protests that followed, they encouraged the king to move 
against them. This resulted in the resignation of Suchinda and the fonnation of 
a new civilian government led by the Democrats. However, it is too soon to 
conclude that this has finally ended disunity between military elites, or between 
them and civilian politicians, thereby completing Thailand's progress to stable 
democracy. The Far Eastern Economic Review (20 May 1993:19) reports that 
despite the elevation of new military commanders, Suchinda has remained in 
Bangkok and 'is still regarded by officers of the previously powerful Class 5 of 
Chulachomklao Military Academy as their leader'. 
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Hence, in examining Thailand's political record, one is struck by the 
disunity that has existed between elites, as well as the inability of national 
leaders to contain it. This configuration has been marked by an absence of 
fonnal game rules (for example, enduring constitutions), and it has been 
reflected in a drumbeat of irregular power seizures. But one should not push this 
too far, arguing the elites have shown no restraint at all. Indeed, some analysts 
contend that because coups have been carried out so regularly in Thailand, they 
constitute the model pattern for transferring state power (Chai-Anan 1986:252-
54 ). Accordingly, one may detect some strands ofinfonnal agreement over the 
ways in which military elites should ascend their hierarchies (for example, 
taking the 'classic route' as commander of the First Anny, garrisoned in 
Bangkok, ibid.:241) and the methods they should use in mounting their coups. 
In particular, coup makers have refrained from mobilizing grievances among 
outsider student movements, labour organizations, peasants, or religious groups. 
Further, though coups have sometimes involved violence, military factions 
have largely spared one another, inflicting it instead on societal audiences. 
Generals who have lost these competitions have then been permitted to avoid 
trials by leaving the country (for example, Thanom, Praphat, and Narong in 
1973, and the Young Turk leader, Colonel Manoon in 1985), perhaps returning 
laterto compete yetagain (forexample, Thanom in 1976). Finally, in regulating 
these activities, the king has monitored coups, sanctioning some attempts while 
advising against others. Thus, in surveying political succession in Thailand over 
a sixty-year period, Neher (1992: 586) concludes that coups and coup attempts 
have been ' smooth enough' that they have not disrupted policy making or 
administration. 
But despite these elements of restraint, the elite configuration in Thailand 
remains riddled by personalist loyalties and military factions, leaving it even 
less unified than Indonesia's. Further, the coups that have resulted, however 
clinically they have been executed, must be understood as seizures of state 
power. And their astonishing regularity in Thailand only confirms the instability 
of the country's regime. 
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Mal,aysia 
The forbearance shown by state elites in Malaysia stands in contrast to the 
muted rivalries between Indonesian elites and the more clear-cut disunity 
evident in Thailand. To investigate this briefly, we can focus on two ways in 
which elites have agreed on the distribution of state power: across the organi­
zations that make up the state, and between the country's ethnic communities. 
We will see that in Malaysia, cooperation between state elites has generally 
persisted, while ethnic relations have gradually been adjusted, giving the 
country's regime form an unusual level of stability. 
First, while elite statuses in Malaysia - like the other cases in this study 
- have mainly been based on state organizations, they have clustered around 
a governing party coalition more than the bureaucracy or military. The origins 
of this configuration lie in colonial experience. Very briefly, like the Dutch in 
Indonesia and refonning monarchs in Thailand, the British built an elaborate 
bureaucracy in the 'protectorate' of Malaya, staffing its middle and lower levels 
with local aristocrats. They also formed a small, indigenous military force, the 
Malay Regiment. But unlike the Dutch who (by waging, then losing, a violent 
colonial struggle) brought local military and bureaucratic elites to the fore, and 
Thai monarchs whose absolutism provoked a coup by the military and bureau­
cracy, the British relinquished power peacefully to a party coalition. Further, by 
interacting cooperatively with the leaders of this coalition, as well as the leaders 
of other state organizations, the British helped forge consensus over their 
power-sharing arrangements. 1bis consensus has endured. Since independence 
in 1957, while the governing coalition's name and make-up has changed, 
national leaders and elites have maintained its centrality amid a wider webwork 
of unified relations. 
The pivotal party within this coalition, the United Malays National Orga­
nization (UMNO), recruited aristocratic civil servants into its leadership posi­
tions during the 1950s and 1960s. In later decades, the illANO greatly enlarged 
the bureaucracy, expanding agencies and budgets with which broadly to 
dispense patronage and re-energize its support. But while top bureaucrats took 
new roles in the UMNO, and bureaucratic resources mounted steadily, this did 
more to strengthen the hand of the UMNO than the power of the bureaucracy. 
Similarly, UMNO leaders have maintained their paramountcy over the military, 
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relying on close familial ties and patronage links. In these circumstances, 
military elites have been content to seek benefits from the government, rather 
than to transcend or oust it, a posture that has not been disturbed by any bolder 
claims to nationalism than the government has put forth (given the military' s 
modest role during decolonization), or any assertions of greater virtue or 
technocratic efficiency (given the government's nearly continuous record of 
economic growth). Overall, one may thus observe that at the state level, relations 
between elites have been unified in Malaysia, sparing the governing coalition 
the executive and military coups that commonly clog governments elsewhere in 
the region. 
Cooperation between Malaysian elites has been evident in another way, 
enabling them to surmount a second, more unusual, kind of challenge. Most 
countries in Southeast Asia, of course, contain minorities of' overseas' Chinese 
that collectively have prospered more than 'indigenous' populations have done. 
Generally, though, they have either been assimilated culturally (as in Thailand 
and the Philippines) or circumscribed tightly (as in Indonesia and Indochina), 
thereby easing or suppressing societal grievances over inequalities. But in 
Malaysia's 'divided' or 'plural' society, the Chinese community has made up 
nearly one-third of the population. It has thus been sizeable enough that it was 
able earlier to sustain a mass-level uprising (that is, the Emergency during the 
1950s), and economically powerful enough that it has blunted government 
policies through investment 'strikes' and capital flight (for example, helping 
secure amendments to the Industrial CoordinationActduri.ng the late 1970s and 
1980s). But it should not be supposed that because the Chinese community has 
been large and economically powerful, Malay state elites have been forced to 
accommodate it. One can readily think of instances in which the state has 
uprooted vital economic minorities (for example, East Indians in Uganda and 
kulaks in Stalinist Russia), even to the point of waging ethnic civil wars (as in 
Sri Lanka). That Malay elites have accommodated Chinese elites, then, tolerat­
ing their business activities and even sharing out state power, must be attributed 
more to choice and negotiation than a simple functionalist account would 
suggest. 
Specifically, during negotiations over decolonization, ethnic Malay and 
Chinese elites concluded a constitutional 'bargain', apportioning the lion's 
share of state power to the Malays, but restraining them from impinging 
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seriously upon corresponding Chinese control of the economy. 10 To then close 
this deal, these elites exchanged enough of their resources that they all en joyed 
something of both worlds. UMNO leaders, granting the state licences and 
contracts that sustained Chinese business, in tum received campaign contri­
butions, 'secret funds', and memberships on the boards of Chinese-owned 
companies. Top Chinese businessmen, for their part, were given some political 
voice through the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) in the governing 
coalition. In this way, 'when the whole scene is smveyed, in its social, economic 
and political aspects, it becomes clear that a kind of short-term rough justice 
between theclaims ofthe communities [was]infact .. attained' (Milne 1967:41). 
To be sure, elite relations in Malaysia have periodically been strained. At 
the state level, factionalism erupted within the UMNO during the 'May 
thirteenth' crisis in 1969, after the death of Prime Minister Tun Razak in 1976, 
and after the UMNO 's bitter party election in 1987. But in each case, conflicts 
were resolved within the U:MNO's framework of informal game rules, speci­
fying strong prerogatives for party leaders and soft punishments for challengers. 
These struggles were sometimes embedded in broader ethnic tensions, however, 
prompting the UMNO to adjust the 'bargain'. In particular, many Malays, 
angered by their economic inequalities with the Chinese, abandoned the UMNO 
during the 1969 election. The UMNO won this election, b�t was weakened, and, 
in trying to regain Malay support, it triggered severe ethnic rioting in Kuala 
Lumpur. New UMNO leaders increased their control over the governing 
coalition, then used state power to range deeply into the economy, invoking the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) in order to acquire equity and managerial 
positions for favoured Malays. But despite the grievances that this spawned 
among the Chinese, what stands out is the extent to which they have been able 
still to participate in the country's politics and economy. Overall, it may be 
concluded that elite unity in Malaysia- evident between top position-holders 
in state organizations and across the representatives of ethnic communities -
has sustained regime stability since independence. 
To sum up, state elites in Indonesia, based largely in the overlap between the 
military and bureaucracy, must probably be categorized as disunified. But this 
disunity has been both muted and exploited by an astute national leader, giving 
Indonesia's regime fonn a strong appearance of stability. Conversely, in 
Thailand appearances of profound elite disunity and regime instability- often 
worsened by rash leadership actions- seem mitigated by understandings over 
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how to mount coups, thereby leaving undisturbed some key areas of policy 
making. The fundamentally unstable character of Thailand's regime, however, 
remains plain. And in Malaysia, elites have consistently maintained their unity, 
even while adjusting the tenns of their relations. The effectiveness with which 
they have qone this has been reflected in the unusual continuity of their politics. 
Elite-mass relations and regime openness 
In examining the extent to which a regime is authoritarian or democratic, one 
builds on the prior analysis of state elites to assess their relations with societal 
audiences. Put simply, state elites may strive to control, or respect the 
autonomy of, diverse societal audiences. Controlled relations range from a 
harsh exclusion of societal audiences to various amounts of clientelist, 
patrimonialist, or corporatist inclusion. Though sometimes benign, these 
regimes rigidly structure participation and contestation, thereby 
corresponding with 0 'Donnell and Schmitter' s (1986:57-64) notion of 'hard' 
authoritarianism. Some combination of these approaches describes politics in 
Indonesia. Relations involving greater societal autonomy, however, may 
produce 'soft' authoritarianism, 'hard' democracy, or a fully democratic 
regime. 'Soft' authoritarianism features liberal participation without electoral 
contestation, a regime in which state elites permit societal audiences to form 
opposition parties and voluntary organizations, but refuse to hold regular or 
meaningful elections. 'Hard' democracy features contestation without 
participation, a state 's reliably calling elections, even as it suppresses 
opposition groups and candidates. A 'full' democracy, finally, is characterized 
by both participation and contestation, to the point where organized societal 
audiences are able effectively to contact, and electorally to replace, the state's  
top position holders. Since independence, state elites in Malaysia have 
synthesized elements of soft authoritarianism with hard democracy to produce 
a semi-democratic regime. State elites in Thailand have operated a variety of 
regime fonns, though since 1992 their politics have been fonnally democratic. 
Indonesia 
Under Indonesia's New Order, state elite attitudes toward societal audiences 
have involved steeply hierarchical relations and tireless control. Many authors 
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have noted President Suharto's patriarchal style, his embracing of state elites 
and societal representatives in the 'big GOLKAR family' (keluarga besar 
GOLKAR), while fusing mass populations in rural koperasi (cooperatives). 
Top bureaucrats, through a process of cultural kewajen (' Java-ization'), have 
revitalized their ancient priyayi statuses before ordinary petitioners, thereby 
projecting a marked haughtiness (van Langenberg 1990: 134). And military 
elites, still wary of revolutionary Communism, revivalist Islam, and fissipa­
rous ethnic and regionalist identities, remain vigilant against societal impulses 
to organize autonomously. 
Through schematic 'mentalities', developmentalist promises, and a reper­
toire of dire warnings, state elites have sought to imbue societal audiences with 
outlooks that complement their own. The vague tenets of Indonesia's official 
state ideology, Negara Pancasila (Pancasila State), intimate the virtues of 
consensus and unanimity, while official notions of' organicism' and 'integralism' 
stress the inseparability of state and society. In grounding these ideologies, the 
military has directly filled posts in the GOLKAR and state bureaucracy, then 
sanctioned its roles with additional doctrines of dwifungsi (dual function) and 
karyawan. Societal audiences, in turn, have remained deactivated, trussed up in 
corporatist ties or dispersed as the 'floating mass' .  The Constitution of 1 945 
(Undang-Undang Dasar '45), finally, and the State Policy Outline document 
(GBHN) overlay these concepts and activities with fastidious legalism (hukum). 
State elites assert that societal acceptance of these terms has brought a 
quarter-century cl political stability' economic development (pembangunan ), am 
social harmony. They contrast this record with the consequences of freer 
societal action under Sukarno's Old Order. In particular, they portray the ethnic 
rebellions, religious upheavals, and economic stagnancy during the 1950s as 
having genninated amid democratic openness, erupting finally in the horrific 
mass violence during 1965-66. On this score, van Langenberg (ibid.: 127) notes 
that state elites have used 'the historical memory of the killings' in order to 
fabricate legitimacy. More generally, after declaring the appropriateness of 
strong state power, state elites have cited their legacy of delivering the goods as 
earning them the right to wield it 
This state control of societal audiences - made manifest in ideological 
themes, broad cooptation, and harsh coercion - has produced a 'hard' 
authoritarianism. Accordingly, scholars have found scant space in which to 
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. debate the precise mode of politics in Indonesia, plotting it along a short 
continuum from 'restricted pluralism' to 'totalitarian ambitions' (Macintyre 
1990:6-21 ;  TanterandYoung 1990:215-88). We canperhapscapturelndonesia's 
regime most finely by examining it on the twin dimensions ofliberal participation 
and electoral contestations. In tenns of participation, business finns, profession­
als, industrial workers, peasants, and other societal audiences have been tidily 
collated into functional groups, then linked through the GOLKAR to state elites. 
The cracks within and between these corporatist pillars have been sumptuously 
plugged with patronage. In addition, a spectrum of opposition parties has been 
collapsed into two official, catch-all organizations, the PPP (Development 
Unity Party), which amalgamates Muslim groups, and the the PDI (Indonesian 
Democratic Party), containing nationalist and Christian groups. These party 
vehicles, weakened by their artificiality and 'internal tensions' (Macintyre 
1990:25), have also been barred from canvassing support at the village level. 
Similarly, societal associations have been hampered by the 'ORMAS' legislation 
(Law on Social Organizations) passed in 1985, requiring that they all accept 
Pancasila as theirphilosophical basis (azas mnggal). Hence, while some authors 
maintain that these associations can still exploit some quiet resistance strategies, 
they concede that 'open or outright opposition to the government is currently 
impossible' (Eldridge 1 990:5 1 1  ). In terms of participation, then, Indonesia's 
regime fonn is profoundly illiberal. 
On the contestation axis, elections for the House of Representatives (DPR) 
have been scrupulously held underthe New Order government every five years. 
But while elections have been regular, they have been neither competitive nor 
meaningful in tenns of top state positions. 'Civil servants, community leaders, 
and the electors are all pressured into working for or voting for 
GOLKAR .. . .  [producing a] ritual with a predictable outcome' (van Langenberg 
1990: 1 3 1  ). State elites calculate that predictable elections, like all rituals which 
promise certainty between scenarios of chaos, fetch some political legitimacy. 
Certainty is further assured by removing power over policy making to the 
president and key ministers, none of whom sits in the DPR. Instead, the presi­
dent is accountable to the People 's Consultative Assembly (MPR) which elects 
him-though only after he has secured the appointments ofhalf ofits delegates. 
1bis very limited electoral contestation, then, together with low levels of 
societal participation, produce in Indonesia a deeply authoritarian regime form. 
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Thailand 
In Thailand, state elites have maintained fewer controls over society than in 
Indonesia. However, this cannot be ascribed to bureaucratic and military 
elites, drawn traditionally from upper-class families in Bangkok, having re­
spected the autonomy of societal audiences. Keyes (1987:74-75) writes that 
'members of the bureaucracy [have] assumed that their superior status [has] 
entitled them to detennine what [is] best for the populace without being held 
accountable to representatives of the people'. One also gets a sense of military 
attitudes from recent statements made by General Suchinda Kraprayoon: 'I 
will definitely not play politics. This is not in my ' character ... I cannot go 
begging for votes . . .  I cannot lower myself' (Bangkok Post, 6 March 1990: 163, 
cited in Hewison 1993: 163). Hence, in Thailand, elites have so distrusted the 
motivations of societal audiences that their 'true' preferences would probably 
have been to operate a stable authoritarian regime. Their own disunity, how­
ever, has prevented this, interrupting broad patrimonialist networks and tight 
corporatist structures. In consequence, elite behaviour toward societal audi- -
enceS",has oscillated between zealous repression, casual clientelism, and mo­
ments of bewildennent and quiescence, producing unstable cycling between 
authoritarian, semi-democratic, and occasionally democratic regime forms. 
In these circumstances, state elites have been unable to attach lasting 
ideological doctrines to their politics. While the military has historically linked 
its claim to state power to its fight against communism, a task that has spurred 
a rural developmentalist mission, the value of this message has plainly receded 
(Neher 1992:603). Bureaucratic claims to state power have been based on 
expertise, but they often diverge sharply from public perceptions of inaccessibility 
and corruption. And Thailand's political parties, during their short stays in 
office, have turned more on personalities and contracts than issue areas and 
programmes. In seeking legitimation, then, state elites have had to reach outside 
their own procedures and policies. Specifically, General Sarit resuscitated the 
monarchy during the early 1960s, holding it aloft as a symbol of 
grand-benevolence and continuity. Further, state elites have relied on the 
Buddhist Sangha (monastic order), inviting monks to perform rituals at state 
functions, and arranging their hierarchy to parallel the machinery of provincial 
administration (Keyes 1987: 140). 
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But even though state elites have been severely _ disunified and denied 
ideological cover, they have generally kept competition over state power to 
themselves. In other words, while overthrowing governments and sparking 
irregular changes between authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes, elites 
have avoided opening the regime so widely that they have freely admitted 
societal audiences. Chai-Anan records that between 1932 and 1987, periods of 
semi-democracy added up to more than 34 years, and fully authoritarian regimes 
existed for thirteen years. Combined democratic experience, however, totalled 
only six years (Chai-Anan 1989:322). 
Within this rapid pendulation, one thus observes that state elites have most 
commonly operated semi-democracies, a regime form that was perhaps best 
articulated under Prem Tinsulanond 's government during the 1980s. In terms of 
participation, this meant that student, labour, and farmer groups were allowed 
to organize - ' albeit on a restricted basis' (Keyes 1987: 101) - and that the 
state, while retaining ownership of most electronic media outlets, permitted a 
free print media. Given this scope for societal autonomy, semi-democratic 
politics under Prem could be classified as moderately liberal. 
On the contestation axis, however, while state elites took care to hold 
elections, they did so to strengthen support for their own positions rather than 
to open up avenues for new position-holders. During Prem 's tenure, the House 
ofRepresentatives was freely elected, but its activities �ere checked by a Senate 
made up mostly of appointed military and civilian bureaucrats. Further, as in 
Indonesia, state power was shifted to the executive, overseen by a prime 
minister who neither sat in the assembly nor was a member of any party. 
Chai-Anan (1989:39) thus concludes that 'electoral participation by the masses 
[was] ritualistic or mobilized participation rather than voluntary political 
action' .  In short, Thailand's semi-democracy featured some fairly autonomous 
societal organizations, but little real chance for those organizations to gain 
electoral access to state power. 
But state elites in Thailand have also confronted societal audiences that, 
since the 1970s, have been inspirited by greater socio-economic change than has 
occurred in Indonesia. Thus, at junctures where deep elite stalemates have 
coincided with surges in mass resentments, democratization has at least briefly 
peeped through. In Neher's  account, Thailand's first significant democratic 
'interregnum' occurred in 1973 when organized student movements 
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brought intramilitary rifts into the open, and important generals, out­
raged by the policies of [Prime Minister] Thanom .. .  refused to put 
down the stud�nt revolt. Moreover, the king, who was appalled by the 
violence and who provided moral support to the students, caused 
many in the military who revered his work to be reluctant to use force, 
and in the absence of a unified military response, the revolt succeeded 
(Neher 1992:590; see also Keyes 1987:84). 
However, the student movement that prompted the regime change and the 
Democrat Party that came later to power were no better able to maintain elite 
unity and stability. Indeed, one may note the ambivalence of Thailand's 
democratic forces when factions of right-wing students emerged, the Democrat 
Party 'broke into left, centre, and right groups, with none willing to support the 
other' (Neher 1992:592) and the king, swiftly reassessing democracy's worth, 
endorsed the military's return to power in 1976. 
Similarly, Thailand's quick regime changes in 1988-92 can be understood 
in terms of elite disunity coupled with new societal groups which, while 
increasingly activist, remained ambivalent about the fomis that regimes should 
take. Briefly, Thailand stumbled through a democratically elected Chart Thai 
government during 1988-91 ,  an authoritarian regime under the National Peace 
Keeping Council during 1991-92, a semi-democratic S amakhitam government 
under General Suchinda from March until May 1 992, and finally, 
redemocratizati.on ushering in a Democratic-led coalition in September. It is 
uncertain, however, whether Thailand' s  new democracy will be consolidated. 
Though it is doubtless more costly now for military elites to seize power, they 
may calculate that it is more costly still to remain in the barracks while their 
honour is despoiled and their benefits withdrawn. Moreover, though much has 
been made of the democratic sentiments of Thailand's rising bourgeoisie andits 
cellular-phone-toting middle class, it is notable that these entities greeted the 
1991  coup with vague approval, that top business executives as readily joined 
General Suchinda's cabinet in 1992 as they had that of the Chart Thai government 
(ibid. :599, 602)11 and that images of the middle class leading protests against 
Suchinda in 'Black May' have not been confirmed by available data (King 
1992: 1 1 13-4). Hence, while Thailand today features a regime that in temis of 
participation and contestation appears fully democratic, the rise of elite-mass 
attitudes necessary to sustain it are not clear. 
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Malaysia 
Since independence in 1957, state elites in Malaysia have remained much 
more unified than elites in Indonesia and Thailand. They could thus have 
probably maintained their regime's stability, regardless of whether it took an 
authoritarian, semi-democratic, or democratic form. Let us briefly investigate 
the reasons, then, that state elites in Malaysia have plumped almost continu­
ously for semi-democracy. 
On the one hand, elite attitudes toward mass populations have involved 
strongly patrimonialist controls, swaying elites toward an authoritarian regime. 
Within the Malay community, elite-mass relations have often been described as 
'feudal',  marked by a 'culture of deference' and 'obligatory followership' 
(Kessler 1992: 148, 155). Similarly, in writing about the Chinese in Malaysia, 
Pye (1985 :255) asserts boldly that 'the system of authority is unambiguous: one 
party and one man run the entire enterprise, everyone is expected to join in the 
consensus, and any deviant is automatically classified as a subversive' .  Thus, in 
taking these ethnic communities together, Means (1975: 153, 195 ,214) concludes 
that 'elites tend to treat the public very patronizingly by making emotional and 
manipulative appeals, suggesting a rather low opinion of the ability of the public 
to participate rationally and sensibly in the political process '. Moreover, the 
rivalries between these communities have stiffened elite notions of control, 
impelling UMNO leaders to accumulate state power through which to enforce 
'Malay dominance' .  
At the same time, this Malay dominance has fuelled Chinese resenunents, 
encouraging many Chinese to support opposition parties, Mandarin primary 
schools, and various cultural displays. In addition, Chinese businessmen remain 
able to shift their capital from Malaysia's economy to overseas markets. The 
UMNO thus recognizes that it would be costly - though, I submit, not 
impossible - to close off all avenues for autonomous Chinese organization. 
Crouch (1993: 152) writes: 
the very division of society into communal segments in itself consti­
tutes a built-in check on the use of authoritarian powers. Malay 
political leaders are aware that any attempt on their part to establish 
an exclusively Malay regime would meet with enormous resistance 
from the non-Malay part of society. Not only would they face social 
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upheaval and the risk of civil war but would have to deal with 
economic disruption if Chinese skills and capital were withdrawn. 
In this same way, when confronting Islamic revivalism among the Malays, 
state elites have been able to contain it (and in some instances to coopt it), but 
would find it difficult to eradicate completely. In sum, while unified state elites 
in Malaysia could operate a variety of stable regimes, they have evaluated 
semi-democracy as the least costly way to balance societal forces and perpetuate 
their statuses. 
In seeking legitimacy for these arrangements, it may be observed that 
ideological appeals are less articulated in Malaysia than in Indonesia, though 
more so than in Thailand. Put very simply, the UMNO has anchored its right to 
rule in the indigene status of its Malay following, a 'prior occupation' and 
'ownership of the country' (Horowitz 1985:202-203). This has translated into 
a broad proclamation of 'Malay dominance' (ketauanan M elayu) overth! 'Land 
of the Malays' (Tanah Melayu) (Crouch 1993:151). But the UMNO has sought 
also to legitimate its paramountcy before the Chinese, gathering subordinate 
Chinese parties into its Baris an Nasional (National Front) coalition and relying 
on them to magnify the tnviNO's forbearance on some issues into an image of 
power sharing. State elites thus allude to the 'Barisan way', the special needs 
of a 'multiracial society', and the virtues of a 'Malaysian identity'. Surveying 
this uneven, though significant, power-sharing, Zakaria has characterized 
ethnic relations as 'hegemonic with accommodationist elements' (Zakaria 
1986:235). It can probably also be said that these appeals have succeeded in 
winning legitimacy before most Malays without utterly alienating the Chinese, 
or at least without disturbing a Chinese acquiescence born of the recognition that 
things could be worse. 
Let us briefly sketch out Malaysia's semi-democracy in terms of liberal 
participation and electoral contestation. In tenns of participation, state elites 
have generally allowed opposition parties, professional associations, trade 
unions, and many other kinds of cause-oriented and cultural groups to organize 
and operate at modest levels. On the other hand, the government has acted 
systematically to cap such participation, registering and circumscribing groups 
through the Societies Act, extending a near monopoly over media ownership that 
greatly tames public expression, and applying a range of security provisions 
against ardent critics. One thus concludes that while participation has been fairly 
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autonomous in Malaysia, it has not been uncontrolled, and rarely has it been 
permitted to shape policy making directly. 
With respect to contestation, the government has reliably held elections 
since independence in 1957. The prime minister, put up by the party that wins 
these elections, has remained ascendant over the military and bureaucracy, thus 
highlighting the meaningfulness of his office. But while opposition parties are 
able to get into Malaysia's parliament, they are hindered in winning the 
majorities necessary to control it, and even in winning in the legislative 
assemblies of more than a few states. Election day, then, presents only a 
'snapshot' of propriety, obscuring a period beforehand marred by severe 
malapportionment of districts, a short campaign period, bans on outdoor 
opposition rallies, and the government's partisan use of media channels, state 
equipment, and off-the-cuff development grants. In these circumstances, Crouch 
(forthcoming, Chapter 4) observes that 'the Malaysian electoral system . . .  [has 
been] so heavily loaded in favour of the government that it is hard to imagine 
that the ruling coalition, as long as it remained united, could be defeated in an 
election'.  In sum, a murky liberalism and electoralism have combined in 
Malaysia in a semi-democracy. 
But for reasons having largely to do with deep economic recession and loss 
of patronage, the governing UMNO split into two parties in 1988. Put very 
briefly, many middle-class Malays who had been nurtured by theNEP were cast 
suddenly adrift causing them to view the UMNO less as a conduit to business 
success than as a barrier. The UMNO (Baru) (New UMNO) remained in power 
under Prime Minister Mahathir, while theSemangat '46 (Spirit of ' 46) went into 
opposition under the former Finance minister, Tengku Razaleigh. In this way, 
factionalism within the U::MNO gave rise to a more competitive party system 
leading up to the 1990 general election. But as Malaysia's economy recovered, 
the UMNO (Baru) was able to renew its patronage flows and recover support, 
revealing that many middle-class Malays were less interested in .mounting 
political opposition than in sharing in boom cycles. Thus, by the time the 1990 
election was held, middle-class Malays felt little need to change the government 
- and even less need to press for regime change that would in future elections 
make regular, democratic changes of government possible. In consequence, 
Razaleigh's Semangat ' 46 peiformed poorly at the polls, and the party has since 
been hollowed out by a procession of defectors to the UMNO (Baru). Thus, 
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despite the deep socio-economic changes in Malaysia that converged recently 
in new prospects for regime openness, state elites were able to perpetuate a 
semi-democracy, snatching back concessions once pressures abated. 
To summarize, in the three countries covered in this paper, state elites have 
held attitudes toward societal audiences that have been largely dismissive, 
disposing them strongly to favour authoritarian regimes. Under Indonesia's 
New Order, elites have muted their rivalries enough that they have been able act 
on these preferences, thereby perpetuating a 'hard' authoritarianism. Moreover, 
they have deadened any lingering societal autonomy with elaborate 'mentali­
ties'. Conversely, in Thailand, disunified elites have been unable to moderate 
their factional behaviour, or even fully to control their societal audiences. In 
these circumstances, elite struggles and societal upsurges have fuelled nearly 
continuous change between authoritarian, semi-democratic, and democratic 
politics. As such, there are few reasons for thinking that Thailand's present 
democracy will persist. Malaysia, finally, presents still another set of outcomes, 
framed by Indonesia's hard authoritarianism and Thailand's unstable democ­
racy. Put simply, while elites in Malaysia have remained unified enough that 
they would probably have been able to maintain any regime form, they have 
operated a semi-democracy. In this context, they have controlled some societal 
audiences, yet eased controls over others, enabling them to conserve state 
resources without endangering their statuses. These arrangements have made 
rigid legitimating mentalities unnecessary, pennitting elites to spin some light 
slogans and shibboleths. 
Conclusion 
We conclude by asking how well this elite-centred framework has addressed 
problems of regime stability and democracy. In taking a first, disaggregating, 
cut that posits elites as the main causal variable, some deficiencies in the 
framework might seem immediately to crop up. Put simply, because elites are 
only elites in the context of organized followings, one might doubt the utility 
of investigating them separately. Attempts to go further, analyzing inter-elite 
relations apart from elite-mass relations, would therefore appear still more 
problematic. In short, movement on one axis must impact on the other. Thus, 
while elites may find scope for manreuvre, as they draw nearer in consensual 
unity they must gradually grow distant from their societal audiences. The 
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reverse would also seem true. In growing more responsive to their followings, 
elites may re-energize their statuses, but they trade off their solidarity with 
other elites. Expanding this logic would also suggest that the state cannot 
clearly be distinguished from the societ}r in which it is located. 
Turning from elites to what in the framework have been identified as 
dependent variables, questions emerge about separating stability and instability 
from authoritarianism and democracy. Is it not possible that a regime becomes 
more or less stable precisely because it has been opened or closed. Indeed, many 
observers contend that regimes can only be made stable by opening them up 
fully to the just demands of societal audiences. Contrarily, many governments 
claim that opening up regimes to unruly mass publics is what puts stability at 
risk. Whichever view might be right, they both articulate a strong dynamic 
between a regime's major dimensions. Hence, to disaggregate stability and 
democracy, like separating elites from their audiences, is to overlook their 
interconnectedness, indeed their inextricability, causing grave distortions in 
analysis. 
This shades into a final question about whether the gulf injected by the 
framework between inter-elite and elite-mass relations on one side, and regime 
outcomes on the other is not also contrived. For many observers, elite attitudes 
and relations are the regime fonn; their game rules are the regime's procedures. 
Any explanations teased from the false separation between them must quickly 
bog down in tautologies. 
But this query, at least, can be dealt with fairly quickly. In Thailand, for 
example, while a democratic regime now formally exists, elite-level commit­
ments to it remain doubtful. This disparity between subdued motivations and 
formal procedures makes plain the disjunction between elite attitudes and 
regime outcomes. It enables us also to predict that Thailand's democracy will 
not persist. In this same way, it may be noted that appearances of regime stability 
in Indonesia are belied by elite-level tensions, held only in abeyance by an artful 
national leader. We can thus predict that regime change will occur in Indonesia 
with the passingofthatleader, though toward some new fonn of authoritarianism, 
rather than democracy. Conversely, the persistence of semi-democracy in 
Malaysia has depended on elites underutilizing the opportunities for mobilization 
that the regime has fonnally made available to them. In tum, we have little 
trouble in differentiating analytically between inter-elite relations and formal 
regime outcomes. 
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More generally, to deny the separability of elites from masses and their 
relations from regimes is in many ways to repack the old black box of political 
systems. Itis probably also to shift inquiry about authoritarianism and democracy 
back to levels of socio-economic development, class or ethnic structures, 
political culture, and the like. But as we know, these factors are all notoriously 
wayward. For example, in challenging the correlation between development 
and democracy, O'Donnell ( 1973) shows in his classic study of bureaucratic­
authoritarianism that it was in South America's richest countries during the 
1960s and 1970s that democracy collapsed. Rueschemeyer, Stephens and 
Stephens ( 1992) demonstrate that the bourgeoisie and middle class are as likely 
to enter state-capital alliances that reconfirm authoritarianism as they are to lead 
�Y democratic change. Similarly, multi.ethnic social structures have been 
variously understood as prompting states to adopt strong 'control models ' 
(Lustick 1979), and as generating autonomous 'intermediate groups' which can 
resist state controls. Finally, as Huntington (1990) has pointed out, if all 
societies were forever imprisoned by their political cultures, democracy would 
nowhere have emerged. It is thus difficult to see how we can explain the impact 
of these structures and forces upon politics without recognizing the coherence 
and direction given to them by leadership and elites. As such, elites may deserve 
a new look in the literature, and they may offer the basis for a comparative 
approach to explaining regimes in Southeast Asia. 
Notes 
1 Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1990:7-9) writes: 
partially stable regimes are neither fully secure nor in imminent danger of collapse. Their 
institutions have perhaps acquired some measure of depth, flexibility, and value, but not 
enough to ensure the regime safe passage through severe challenges .. . .  Semi-democratic 
regimes exist where the effective power of elected officials is so limited, or political party 
competition is so restricted, or the freedom and fairness of elections so compromised that 
electoral outcomes, while competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences; 
or where civil and political liberties are so limited that some political orientations and 
interests are unable to organize and express themselves. 
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2 The parallel to this may be that totalitarianism, as understood by Linz, was not simply an 
extrapolation from democracy through authoritarianism and thus more of the same. Its 
dimensions were instead distinctly different (see Linz 1975: 175-41 1). 
3 Huntington writes that 'negotiations and compromise among political elites were at the heart 
or the democratization processes .... Whether the initiative for democratization came from the 
government, from the opposition, or from both, at some point the key players reached 
agreements on the crucial aspects of the democralization process and the new system that 
was to be created' (Huntington 1990: 165-66). 
4 At this point, the distinction between elites and regimes becomes clearer. While a democratic 
regime may formally permit the full venting of mass grievances, unified elites, guided by 
informal game rules, resist doing so. 
5 They also note that 'democracy could only be consolidated where elite interests were 
effectively protected' (ibid.: 150). 
6 One example of this is Chile's experience under Allende's elected government. 
7 Elsewhere, Rueschemeyer et al. write: 'the state has many ways of shaping the development 
of civil society. It can cease or obstruct the organization of different class interests; it can 
empower or marginalize existing organizations; it may succeed in cooptation and, in the 
extreme, use whole organizational networks as conduits of hegemonic influence' (ibid.: 67). 
8 Michael van Langenberg writes that 'it is impossible to identify any major faction in the 
ruling elite which would want to risk political stability by challenging Suharto too far' (van 
Langenberg 1990 :138). 
9 Keyes writes that 'pressures from outside groups and from internal tensions between 
technocrats and old-style officials have not yet led to a transformation of the. bureaucratic 
polity, but the civil service elite can no longer manipulate the instruments of state power for 
their own ends with total impunity' (Keyes 1987: 144 ). 
10 Safeguards for Chinese business activities are contained in Article 153, Section 9 of the 
Malaysian Constitution which states that 'nothing in this Article shall empower Parliament to 
restrict business or trade solely for the purpose of reservations for Malays . .. ' .  
11 In analyzing the elections that brought the Samakhitam party to power, Neher (1992:599) 
writes about the 'unseemly move among candidates toward wealthy parties, with no concern 
whatsoever for the stance of the party on issues or ideological direction. For the majority of 
the candidates, the only concern was which party made the best money offer' .  He records 
also that after Suchinda took power, 'most of the cabinet members were wealthy business 
executives and military leaders .... [and that] the appointed senate ... was-dominated by leading 
military officers, top bankers, wealthy industrialists, and business executives' (ibid.:602). 
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